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Environmental Law
by Travis M. Trimble*
In 2017, district courts decided several issues that the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit had never addressed.' The
United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia concluded
that the Clean Water Act's (CWA)2 prohibition on the discharge of
pollutants into waters of the United States without a permit extended to
discharges into groundwater with a "direct hydrological connection" to
surface waters within the Act's scope.3 The court also concluded that a
state-permitted land application system, whereby wastewater is sprayed
onto fields as means of treatment and disposal, constituted a "point
source" within the meaning of the CWA.4 Finally, the court concluded
that the Burford v. Sun Oil Co.5 abstention does not apply to citizen-suits
brought under the CWA.6 The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama concluded that the Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)7
discovery rule for statutes of limitations did not preempt Alabama's
discovery rule, where the plaintiff did not produce facts in his state law
based tort claim for exposure to hazardous substances that would support
a claim under CERCLA. 8 In a case that raised no novel issues of law, the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida upheld the
National Park Service's finding of no significant impact in favor of a
*Instructor, University of Georgia School of Law. Mercer University (B.A., 1986);
University of North Carolina (M.A., 1988); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 1993).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of environmental aw during the prior survey period, see Travis M.
Trimble, Environmental Law, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 68 MERCER L. REV. 1003 (2017).
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012).
3. Flint Riverkeeper, Inc. v. S. Mills, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1366 (M.D. Ga. 2017).
4. Id. at 1368.
5. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
6. Flint Riverkeeper, 276 F. Supp. 3d at 1369-70.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2018).




private mineral rights holder's plan to survey for oil and gas reserves in
the Big Cypress National Preserve in Southern Florida.9
I. CLEAN WATER ACT
In Flint Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Southern Mills, Inc.,10 the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Georgia ruled that the plaintiffs
successfully stated a claim under the Clean Water Act's11 citizen-suit
provision1 2 that defendant's land application system (LAS) of its
industrial wastewater violated the Clean Water Act (CWA). The court
answered several questions that the Eleventh Circuit had not decided.
First, the court concluded that the CWA applied to a discharge of
pollutants from a point source into groundwater with a direct hydrologic
connection to surface water that is a jurisdictional water of the United
States.13 Second, the court concluded that a permitted LAS is a point
source within the meaning of the CWA.14 Third, the court concluded that
the Burford v. Sun Oil Co. abstention does not apply to citizen-suits
brought under the CWA.15
The defendant operates a protective fabrics mill in Molena, Georgia. It
treats its industrial wastewater by discharging it onto land via a LAS.
The defendant's LAS involves spraying the wastewater onto three fields
via a series of spray heads.1 6 The defendant has two water permits issued
by the State of Georgia: a National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permit,1 7 allowing the discharge of storm water mixed
with "certain pollutants from its LAS fields;"18 and a LAS permit allowing
it to operate its LAS subject to "various effluent limitations and
monitoring requirements."1 9 The plaintiffs, a group organized to protect
the Flint River corridor and several individual landowners along Flint
tributaries, filed suit against the defendant for violating its NPDES
permit under the CWA, and for trespass, nuisance, and negligence under
state law. The complaint generally alleged that because of the volume of
9. Nat'1 Res. Def. Council v. Nat'1 Park Serv., 250 F. Supp. 3d 1260, 1298 (M.D. Fla.
2017).
10. 276 F. Supp. 3d 1359 (M.D. Ga. 2017).
11. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1275 (2018).
12. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2018).
13. Flint Riverkeeper, 276 F. Supp. 3d at 1367.
14. Id. at 1368.
15. Id. at 1369.
16. Id. at 1362.
17. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2018).




wastewater the defendant sprayed on its LAS fields, the soil became
saturated and during rain events, the wastewater left the fields,
traveling both overland through ditches and other channels into surface
waters regulated under the CWA, and into groundwater that has a
"direct hydrological connection" to surface waters.20 The defendant
moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction21
and for failure to state a claim.22
The court first concluded that the plaintiffs' complaint established
subject matter jurisdiction over the CWA claim.23 Although the
defendant claimed that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
because the defendant had stopped discharging polluted wastewater
when it received the plaintiffs' ante litem notice, and thus, its alleged
violations were wholly in the past, the court found that the complaint's
allegations of ongoing storm water runoff containing pollutants from the
LAS fields constituted allegations of "continuous or intermittent"
discharges of pollutants that were sufficient to withstand a facial
challenge to subject matter jurisdiction.24
The defendant also moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state
a claim, arguing that the complaint failed to allege facts plausibly
showing that (1) the defendant's discharge of wastewater into
groundwater via its LAS constituted a discharge into "navigable
waters";25 (2) discharges were from a "point source"; and (3) discharges
were in violation of an NPDES permit. All three are essential elements
of a claim under the CWA.26
First, the court concluded that the complaint's allegations that the
wastewater discharges that reached groundwater that was
"hydrologically connected" to surface waters stated a claim of discharge
to navigable waters.27 The court noted that groundwater itself is not
"navigable water" under the CWA, and the Eleventh Circuit had not yet
addressed whether the CWA prohibits a discharge into groundwater that
reaches navigable water via a hydrological connection.28 However, the
court noted that its decision was consistent with that of other district
20. Id. at 1362-63.
21. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(1); Flint Riverkeeper, 276 F. Supp. 3d at 1364.
22. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6); Flint Riverkeeper, 276 F. Supp. 3d at 1365.
23. Flint Riverkeeper, 276 F. Supp. 3d at 1364.
24. Id. at 1364-65.
25. The defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of the allegations that its
discharges that reached surface water over land constituted a discharge into "navigable
waters." Id. at 1366.
26. Id. at 1365.
27. Id. at 1367.
28. Id. at 1366-67.
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courts that had addressed the issue, and with the Environmental
Protection Agency's (EPA) regulations interpreting the CWA to apply to
such discharges.29
Second, the court concluded that the complaint sufficiently alleged
discharges from a point source.30 The court explained first that the
allegations that wastewater left the defendant's property "via ditches,
runnels, seeps, and other discrete conveyances"31 sufficiently alleged
point source discharges over land.32 Next, although the Eleventh Circuit
had not addressed the issue, the court concluded that as to the alleged
discharges into groundwater, the LAS itself was a point source.33 Finally,
the court concluded that the spray heads the defendant's LAS used to
spray the wastewater onto the fields constituted point sources.34
Third, the court concluded that the complaint successfully alleged a
violation of the defendant's NPDES permit.3 5 The court explained that
while the defendant had an NPDES permit authorizing the "discharge of
storm water mixed with certain pollutants," the permit did not authorize
"the discharge of storm water mixed with 'process wastewater."'36
Because the complaint alleged that during storms the LAS fields, already
saturated with wastewater, leached over land into surface water
tributaries of the Flint, it alleged a violation of the permit.37
Finally, the court ruled against he defendant on its demand that the
court abstain from exercising jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claim
because the relief they sought would "effectively nullify defendant's
state-issued LAS permit."38 The defendant argued that abstention was
proper under a principle the Supreme Court of the United States
announced in Burford.39
According to the district court, "Burford abstention applies (1) when
difficult questions of state law concerning policy problems of substantial
public import transcend the case at bar; or (2) where federal judicial
review would disrupt state efforts to establish a coherent policy as to a
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1368. The CWA only prohibits discharges of pollutants from "point sources,"
which are defined as "any discernable, confined, and discrete conveyance." Id. at 1367.
31. Id. at 1367.
32. Id. at 1367-68.




37. Id. at 1368-69.




matter of substantial public concern."40 While the Eleventh Circuit had
not addressed this issue, the court concluded that the defendant's right
to "operate its LAS in accordance with its state-issued LAS permit is no
defense to a CWA suit,"41 and that the court would not abstain from
exercising its jurisdiction, because abstention "would essentially deprive
[the plaintiffs] of the statutory right that Congress saw fit to confer upon
them"42 with the citizen-provision of the CWA.43
II. CERCLA PREEMPTION
In Arnold v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co. LLC,44 the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama concluded that
a plaintiffs state law claim for personal injury arising out of exposure to
chemicals from the defendant's pipe-making facility was time-barred
under Alabama law.45 The court also concluded, in an issue that the
Eleventh Circuit had not addressed, that the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act's (CERCLA)46
"discovery rule"47 for toxic tort actions did not preempt Alabama law as
to the commencement date of the limitations period, in cases such as this
where the plaintiff did not produce facts that would state a claim under
CERCLA.48 The court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment.49
On September 21, 2015, the plaintiff, Eugene Maddox, sued the
defendant for personal injury and property damage he claimed arose out
of his exposure to chemicals from the defendant's pipe-making plant in
Birmingham. In a pre-litigation demand document, his attorney listed
his injury as hearing loss that was diagnosed in 2006. The plant closed
in 2010.50
The court first concluded that Alabama's applicable two-year statute
of limitations barred the plaintiffs personal injury claim.',1 Prior to the
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1370.
43. Id. at 1369-70 (quoting Long Island Soundkeeper Fund, Inc. v. New York City
Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 27 F. Supp. 2d 380, 385 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)).
44. 274 F. Supp. 3d 1272 (N.D. Ala. 2017).
45. Id. at 1278.
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2018).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1) (2018).
48. Arnold, 274 F. Supp. 3d at 1277-78.
49. Id. at 1278.
50. Id. at 1274-75.
51. Id. at 1276. The defendants did not claim that the plaintiffs property damage claim
was time-barred. Id. at 1275.
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Alabama Supreme Court's decision in Griffin v. Unocal Corp. ,52
Alabama's two-year limitation period for toxic substance exposure claims
commenced on the "date of last exposure."53 In Griffin, the Alabama
Supreme Court held that the two-year period began to run when a
"manifest, present injury" 54 related to toxic exposure occurred.55 An
injury was "manifest" when "its existence is objectively evident and
apparent."56 The district court also noted that the Alabama Supreme
Court held that the new commencement rule would apply prospectively
and to the plaintiffs "whose last exposure to a toxic substance, and first
manifest injury resulting from that exposure, occurred within the two-
year period before"57 the decision in Griffin, on January 25, 2008.58
The court noted that from the information supplied by the plaintiff,
the court could not determine when his injury became manifest, beyond
the year 2006, which may or may not have been within two years of
January 25, 2008.59 However, the court concluded that regardless of
when his injury became apparent, his date of last exposure could not have
been later than December 31, 2010, the year the defendant's plant
closed.6 0 The plaintiff filed his claim in 2015. Thus, under either
commencement rule, his complaint was filed outside the two-year
limitation period.61
The court next rejected the plaintiffs argument that CERCLA's
discovery rule, applicable to state hazardous substance exposure claims,
preempted Alabama's commencement rule.62 CERCLA's discovery rule
"imposes a 'federally required commencement date"'63 on actions brought
under state law for exposure to hazardous substances, pollutants, or
contaminants. Under the rule, a state's limitation period begins to run
on "the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that
the personal injury or property damages . . . were caused or contributed
to by the hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned."64
52. 990 So. 2d 291 (Ala. 2008).
53. Id. at 293.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Cline v. Ashland, Inc., 970 So. 2d 755, 773 (Ala. 2007) (Harwood, J., dissenting).
57. Arnold, 274 F. Supp. 3d at 1275.
58. Griffin, 990 So. 2d at 291.
59. Arnold, 274 F. Supp. 3d at 1275.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1276.
62. Id. at 1277-78.
63. Id. at 1276.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(4)(A) (2018); Arnold, 274 F. Supp. 3d at 1276.
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CERCLA's discovery rule preempts conflicting state statutes of
limitation.65
The court concluded that CERCLA's discovery rule did not preempt
the Alabama commencement rule for its limitation period.66 The court
agreed with the defendant, who argued that CERCLA's discovery rule
preemption applies only when a plaintiff can produce facts which could
support a cause of action under CERCLA, regardless of whether the
plaintiff actually brought a claim under CERCLA.67 The court noted that
the Eleventh Circuit had not specifically addressed the question of
whether CERCLA's discovery rule preempted a state's commencement
rule where a plaintiff did not produce facts in his state claim that would
support a CERCLA claim.68 The court reviewed case law from other
circuits as well as Eleventh Circuit holdings applying the discovery rule
in other contexts, and stated that "[t]he court is persuaded that § 9658's
[preemption] is limited to those cases where facts could support a
CERCLA claim."69
To prove a claim under CERCLA's citizen-suit provision, a plaintiff
would, at a minimum, have to prove that his injury was caused by the
release of hazardous substances into the environment.70 The court
determined that the plaintiff did not produce any evidence that exposure
to hazardous substances caused his hearing loss. 71 Therefore, since he
could not support a claim under CERCLA, the CERCLA discovery rule
did not preempt Alabama's commencement rule for its two-year
limitation period, and the plaintiffs claim was barred by the statute of
limitation.72
III. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. National Park Service,73 the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida found in
favor of the defendant and against the plaintiffs in their challenge to the
mineral rights owner's plan to explore the viability of oil and gas drilling
in Big Cypress National Preserve in Southern Florida.74 The court
65. Arnold, 274 F. Supp. 3d at 1276.




70. Id. at 1277-78.
71. Id. at 1278.
72. Id.
73. 250 F. Supp. 3d 1260 (M.D. Fla. 2017).
74. Id. at 1272.
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concluded that the National Park Service (NPS) and other defendants
had met their obligations under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA),75 the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),76 the
Endangered Species Act (ESA), 77 and NPS regulations when the NPS
issued a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) for the exploration
plan.7 8 The court granted summary judgment to the defendants.7 9
When Congress created the Big Cypress Preserve, it instructed th e
NPS to acquire surface rights to the land, but not oil and gas rights
without the consent of the owner, unless the Preserve was threatened
with uses that would be detrimental to its purpose. As a result, oil and
gas rights under much of the Preserve remain in private hands.8 0 One
large mineral rights holder, Collier Entities, retained Burnett Oil to
explore the viability of oil and gas drilling within the Preserve. Burnett
proposed to do so using "vibroseis buggies" that would roll across terrain
and send seismic waves underground, which in turn bounce off
underground rock formations and return to the surface, where they are
recorded by portable receivers placed on the ground (the Plan).81 Burnett
proposed the Plan to the NPS in November 2013, and over the next two
years, the parties explored possible impacts of the Plan and refined it
until they were satisfied that it complied with NPS regulations. During
this process, Burnett reduced the area it proposed to explore from 400
square miles to 110 square miles.82 On November 20, 2015, the NPS
released an Environmental Assessment (EA) for public comment, and as
a result of those comments the NPS revised the EA and reissued it for
additional comment. During this time, the NPS also engaged in required
consultation with the United States Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS)
regarding potential impacts of the Plan on threatened or endangered
species.83 On February 25, 2015, the FWS issued a letter concurring with
the NPS's biological assessment hat the Plan would not adversely
impact endangered or threatened species within the Plan area.8
On May 6, 2016, the NPS issued a FONSI as a result of the EA for the
Plan, as modified by forty-seven mitigation measures that would be
75. 5 U.S.C. § 501 (2012).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2018).
77. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2018).
78. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 1311.
79. Id. at 1272.
80. Id. at 1274.
81. Id. at 1276-77.
82. Id. at 1277.
83. See id. at 1301.
84. Id. at 1280.
2018] ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1141
required for approval of the Plan.85 The NPS concluded that the kinds of
impacts to the Preserve from the buggies and other off-road vehicles used
in the Plan would be similar to those of recreational off-road vehicles that
had previously been allowed in the Preserve under certain conditions,86
but would be less harmful because of minimization and mitigation
measures. The NPS concluded that impacts to the Preserve would occur
in only 0.01% of the survey area and that any affected resources would
return to their natural conditions within three years.87
On July 27, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit88 challenging the FONSI
and the NPS's consequent failure to require a more detailed
Environmental Impact Statement89 on several grounds under NEPA and
the ESA, contending generally that the NPS's decision to issue a FONSI
was arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The plaintiffs contended
that the NPS violated NEPA and the APA by failing to (1) prepare an
EIS for the Plan; (2) take a "hard look"O at the effectiveness of mitigation
measures that NPS required as part of the final Plan; (3) take a "hard
look" at all adverse impacts of the Plan, including direct, indirect, and
cumulative impacts on the Preserve; and (4) consider all reasonable
alternatives to the Plan.91 The court first addressed the plaintiffs' third
85. Id. at 1281.
86. See Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 835 F.3d 1377 (11th
Cir. 2016).
87. Nat? Res. Def. Council, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 1281.
88. Id. at 1272.
89. A federal agency considering, among other things, a request for a permit for or
approval of private activity that will or may impact the environment may prepare an EA,
a document meant to be a concise and more superficial discussion of potential
environmental impacts of the action. If the agency concludes that environmental impacts
will not be significant, it issues a FONSI. If, on the other hand, the agency determines that
environmental impacts will be significant, the agency must prepare an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS), a more detailed review that analyzes impacts of the proposed
activity, reasonable alternatives, and other factors. Id. at 1284-85.
90. In determining whether an agency's decision not to require an EIS was arbitrary
and capricious, a court considers four criteria:
First, the agency must have accurately identified the relevant environmental
concern. Second, once the agency has identified the problem it must have taken
a "hard look" at the problem in preparing the EA. Third, if a finding of no
significant impact is made, the agency must be able to make a convincing case
for its finding. Last, if the agency does find an impact of true significance,
preparation of an EIS can be avoided only if the agency finds that changes or
safeguards in the project sufficiently reduce the impact to a minimum.
Hill v. Boy, 144 F.3d 1446, 1450 (11th Cir. 1998).
91. Nat? Res. Def. Council, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 1284.
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challenge under NEPA: that the NPS failed to take a hard look at the
adverse impacts of the Plan.92
First, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that NPS should have
considered Burnett's original plan to survey 400 square miles of the
Preserve, an area Burnett reduced during the NPS's original assessment
in order to make assessment of the project more manageable, as part of
the cumulative impacts of the Plan.93 An agency must consider the
cumulative impact of a proposed action, which includes the present
proposed action together with past and "reasonably foreseeable" future
actions. This requirement is to prevent an applicant from breaking a
larger proposed action into smaller pieces for permitting purposes in
order to avoid the EIS requirement.94 The plaintiffs argued that it was
"reasonably foreseeable" to the NPS that Burnett would eventually seek
permission to survey the larger area.95 However, the court found that
there was insufficient evidence that Burnett would ever seek to survey
the remaining area, and thus it was unreasonable to expect the NPS to
evaluate the cumulative impact of a survey over the originally proposed
Plan area.96
Second, the court concluded that the NPS did not act arbitrarily when
it concluded that the Plan would not have a significant impact when
considered with eleven other ongoing projects affecting wildlife and
habitat near the Preserve that were unrelated to the Plan.97 The record
showed that the NPS had considered those projects and their impacts,
and its decision was "well within NPS's expertise to determine that the
other projects would not have a cumulative impact."98
Third, the court concluded that the NPS did not act arbitrarily in
determining that Burnett's use of an off-site staging area for surveying
activities in the Preserve would cause direct impacts by increasing
helicopter flights and off-road travel to and from the Preserve.99
According to the court, the record showed that the NPS did consider the
impacts of those activities, and on balance concluded that the off-site
staging area would have less impact on the Preserve than the originally
proposed on-site staging areas.100
92. Id. at 1285.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1286.
95. Id. at 1285-86.
96. Id. at 1287.
97. Id. at 1287-88.
98. Id. at 1288.
99. Id. at 1288-89.
100. Id.
[Vol. 691142
2018] ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1143
Next, the court turned to the plaintiffs' claim that the NPS failed to
consider all reasonable, less damaging alternatives to the Plan, including
the alternative of acquiring the mineral rights outright. In performing an
EA and evaluating alternatives to the proposed action, an agency must
take into account the purpose of the action and the needs and goals of the
parties involved.101 An agency may not define the objectives of the
proposed action so narrowly that only one alternative meets the goals of
the action nor so broadly that an infinite number of possible actions
would meet the goals.102 The court noted that the NPS had considered
ten alternatives in total, including three alternatives in detail: no action,
surveying using vibroseis buggies (Burnett's proposed Plan), and
surveying using explosives. 10s The NPS concluded that "no action" would
not achieve Burnett's purpose and would likely result in a taking of the
landowner's mineral rights, and that as between the remaining two, the
Plan had less impact on the environment than the alternative of
surveying using explosives.104 The court also found that the NPS
reasonably concluded that NPS's obtaining the mineral rights through
purchase or trade would not accomplish Burnett's goal.105 The court
noted that the Department of Interior had previously proposed buying
the mineral rights under the Preserve but had never received funding
from Congress to do so, making that alternative likely not viable
anyway.106 The court concluded that the NPS had sufficiently considered
enough alternatives to the Plan.107
The court next considered the plaintiffs' claim that the NPS did not
take a "hard look" at the mitigation measures proposed in the Plan based
on which the FONSI was issued.108 Specifically, the plaintiffs complained
that the NPS did not sufficiently investigate Burnett's promises to de-
compact soils and remove ruts, depressions, and vehicle tracks to original
contour conditions, avoid activities on soft soils and standing water, and
operate primarily in "dry season" conditions (when standing water in the
Preserve is at a minimum and soils are more stable).109 The court
concluded that the record showed support for the NPS's conclusion that
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1290.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1290-91.
105. Id. at 1291.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1292.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1293.
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each of these mitigation measures was viable and would result in
lessened environmental impacts.110
Finally, the court addressed the plaintiffs' claim that the NPS had
arbitrarily and capriciously decided against producing an EIS.111 A
proposed action that qualifies as a major federal action, for example one
that significantly affects the environment, requires an EIS.112 Where it
is unclear whether a proposed action is a major federal action, the agency
prepares an EA, which is a "shorter, preliminary statement.. mandated
when a proposed action is neither one normally requiring an EIS nor one
categorically excluded from the EIS process."113 If, as a result of the EA,
the agency determines the proposed action is not a major federal action,
it issues a FONSI, which briefly explains its reasons. The agency's
decision whether a proposed action will have significant impact on the
environment is one which "'implicates substantial agency expertise' and
is entitled to deference."114 The plaintiffs challenged the NPS's FONSI
decision on five grounds,115 and on each, the court concluded that the NPS
had considered the ground and reasonably determined that no finding of
significant impact was warranted.116
First, the plaintiffs asserted that an EIS was required due to the
unique characteristics of the Preserve, including parkland, wetlands, and
ecologically sensitive areas. The court held that the NPS had reasonably
concluded that the Plan would not result in significant impacts to any of
these resources.1 17
Second, the plaintiffs claimed that an EIS was required because the
Plan was "controversial," as evidenced by the 65,000 comments that were
submitted during the public comment period on the original EA. The
court noted that the "controversial" factor in the agency's NEPA
examination of a proposed action means more than simply opposition to
the action.11 8 It means "'scientific or other evidence that reveals flaws in
the methods or data relied upon by the agency in reaching its
110. Id. at 1294-95.
111. Id. at 1295.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting Marsh v. Or. Nat'l Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 376 (1989)).
115. The five grounds were based on five of ten "intensity factors" that agencies should
consider in making a determination of significant impact, set out in NEPA regulations at
section 40-1508.27(b) of the Code of Federal Regulations (2018). See Nat'l Res. Def. Council,
250 F. Supp. 3d at 1295.
116. Nat? Res. Def. Council, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 1296.
117. Id. at 1296--97.
118. Id. at 1297.
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conclusions."'"19 The court concluded that the NPS "reasonably found
that 'there [was] no substantial dispute concerning the effects of the
proposed action."'
120
Third, the plaintiffs argued that the FONSI could establish precedent
for future action with significant impacts because Burnett planned to
seek approval for surveying over other parts of the originally planned 400
square-mile area. The court rejected this argument, noting that the NPS
explained in its response to public comments that it would evaluate each
application for additional surveying independently.121
Fourth, the plaintiffs claimed the Plan would adversely affect
endangered or threatened species because the EA concluded that "'short-
term adverse impacts ... are expected. "'122 The court noted that the EA
also concluded that no "mortality and injury to wildlife" was expected
from the Plan, and given that conclusion, the plaintiffs did not explain
how the adverse effects mentioned in the EA rose to the level of
significant impact.123
Fifth, and finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that
cumulative impacts of the Plan and proposed mitigation measures that
would not succeed, warranted an EIS.124 The court referred to its
previous determinations regarding these factors in response to other
parts of the plaintiffs' complaint.125
The court next rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the NPS violated
its regulations under the Organic Act1 26 pertaining to non-federal oil and
gas operations within national parks. 127 The plaintiffs contended that the
Plan did not contain any description of "technologically feasible
alternative methods of operations, their costs, or their environmental
[impacts,]"128 as required by the regulations. The court concluded that
the information the NPS considered as part of the EA process satisfied
the NPS regulations as well.129
The plaintiffs' complaint also challenged the NPS's FONSI decision
under the ESA. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the NPS's
119. Id.






126. 36 C.F.R. §§ 9.30-9.52 (2018).
127. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 1300.
128. Id. at 1299.
129. Id. at 1300.
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required consultation with the FWS regarding impacts of the Plan to
endangered or threatened species was inadequate, and that the agencies
should have reinitiated consultation (1) when Burnett relocated its
staging area off site and (2) because a new species, the Florida Bonneted
Bat, was listed as endangered in 2013.130
The plaintiffs raised five specific challenges to the adequacy of the
agencies' consultation in connection with the FONSI: (1) the Plan area
the agencies analyzed was unlawfully narrow; (2) the agencies failed to
fully evaluate direct and indirect impacts to listed species; (3) the
agencies failed to evaluate cumulative impacts to listed species by failing
to consider activities outside the Preserve; (4) the agencies failed to use
the "best scientific and commercial data available" for wood storks and
red-cockaded woodpeckers, including maps showing the locations of those
birds in the Plan area; and (5) the agencies relied on mitigation measures
that are "unenforceable, vague, or discretionary."13 1 On each of these
challenges, the court concluded that the agencies had not acted
arbitrarily and capriciously, noting that as to each challenge, the record
showed that the agencies had considered the issues raised by the
plaintiffs, and showed evidence sufficient to support the agencies'
conclusions. 132
Finally, as to the plaintiffs' claims that the agencies should have
reinitiated consultation related to (1) Burnett's relocation of its staging
area to an off-site location and (2) the listing under the ESA of the Florida
Bonneted Bat, the court ruled in favor of the agencies.133 The court
explained that as to the staging-area relocation, the plaintiffs themselves
had requested the relocation to mitigate potential impacts of staging the
survey within the Preserve, and "[i]n any event, the record shows that
the Agencies did reinitiate consultation."134 Next, as to the listing of the
bat, the court first agreed with the defendants that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to challenge the agencies' failure to reinitiate consultation
because the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that implementation of the
Plan would cause them an "injury in fact" with respect to the bat. 135 The
court also concluded that even if the plaintiffs had standing, there was
no obligation to reinitiate consultation. 136 The plaintiffs argued that the
agencies should have reinitiated consultation on a 2010 Preserve
130. Id. at 1300-11.
131. Id. at 1301-06.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1307.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 1309-10.
136. Id. at 1310-11.
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Management Plan when the bat was listed in 2013, but the court noted
that management plans are not agency actions subject to the
consultation requirement, and the Plan's potential effects on the bat had
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